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A theory must be interpreted as a consistent axiom system, and therefore an in-
terpretation of a theory is a consistent axiomatic extension of the theory. A historical
interpretation of a past theory is possible if and only if there is a stream of theories
developed Rom the theory or a Scientific Research Program to which it belongs. We
take three examples. First, an interpretation of the theory ofutility and scarcity shows
that an axiomatic interpretation makes historian’s vision clearer. The second exam-
ple about the marginal productivity theory shows that a mathematical interpretation is
useRtl to solve a conflict of opinions in a past controversy. The third example shows
that there can be plural interpretation ofa past consistent theory. We must review each
altemative interpretation and minimize parts of interpretation alien to the original text.
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1 Interpretation in the History of Economics
There are at least three reasons why interpretation oftheories Rom the past is indispensable
for research into the history of economics. First, in earlier stages in the progression of eco-
nomic theory, most theories were inadequate ffom several points ofview. Early economics
first developed merely as economic thought, and until the $1940s$, most economic theories
were literary. However, since the marginal revolution in the $1870s$, economic theories of-
ten came to be described in terms of mathematics, but most were inadequate as an axiom
system. . Second, even if every theory is described as a consistent axiom system, some past
theories are possibly ambiguous, at least ffom the viewpoint of the most advanced theo-
ries. Third, when the intellectual background of economics changes, it becomes necessary
to rewnite or reconstruct past economic theories. Since the formalist revolution ofthe $1950s$
(Blaug 2003), the way of expressing economic theory has changed under the influence of
Bourbakism (Weintraub, 2002). A typical example is Debreu’s Theory of Value published
in 1959. Modem economic theories come to be expressed as consistent axiom systems or
as mathematical models. For present-day economists to understand a past economic the-
ory, it is necessary to express that theory as a consistent axiom system or a mathematical
model in which the main theorems are proven.
Interpretation is another logical way ofunderstanding economic ideas and for develop-
ing economic theories. Any interpretation is in essence the theoretical contribution of the
interpreter. For example, several interpretations of Keynes’s General Theory ofEmploy-
ment, Interest and Money put forward Scientific Research Programs (SRPs) ofmacroeco-
nomics like Keynesian, Orthodox Keynesian, New Keynesian, Post-Keynesian economics
etc.(Snowdon and Vane, 2005). These are not historical interpretations, because they make
certain theoretical contributions that are quite apart ffom the original theory. A historical
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interpretation must be that showing not only what is achieved by a past economic theory
but also what is not achieved by it.
This paper has 6 sections. In section 2, we confirm that a historical interpretation is one
in a theory developed ffom the original one in the same SRP, as well as being a consistent
extension of the original theory. We show three examples of interpretation of the history
of the general equilibrium theory. The first example, in Section 3, is an interpretation of
the theory of $U\Pi L\Pi Y$ and scarcity in the marginal utility theory. This example shows that
mathematical models support the intuitive understandings of historians of economics. The
second one, in Section 4, applies an old debate, a quarrel, about the marginal productivity
theory. A mathematical model is useffil to organize the debate about the Exhaustion Theo-
rem. The third one, in Section 5, shows that there can be two consistent interpretations of
Wieser’s theory of natural value. In Section 6, we summarize our conclusions.
2 Historical Interpretation of a Past Theory
Suppose a past theory $T$ is developed into a certain theory of the present. If the theory $T$ is
significant in the history of economics, then it can be thought to have been developed to a
certain theory of the present. If the theory $T$ is insufficient, that is to say, it is not axioma-
tizable, includes incompatible propositions, or is impossible to be derived Rom its axioms,
then we cannot understand it as it is posited. To understand a past insufficient theory $T$ , we
have to interpret it as a consistent theory. Therefore, any interpretation of an insufficient
theory must be different from the original theory. From the logical definition of interpre-
tation (Shoenfield 1967: 61-64), we can consider an interpretation to be an extension of
the original theory. If there is an interpretation of $T$ in $T’$ and $T’$ is consistent, then $T$ is
consistent (Shoenfield 1967: 64-65).
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When we interpret a historical theory in the field of economics, we need to pay attention
to the idea of the original theoiy. This idea must be shared by the theories in the SRP
developed ffom the theory. Therefore, we must interpret a past insufficient theory in a
particular present theory developed ffom a theory in the same $SW$.
Suppose that archaeologists discovered a mountain ofbones in a stratum ofthe Jurassic
period. In the stratum, a variety of bones are mixed together, constituting distinct sets
of a dinosaur’s skeleton. The archaeologists classi $\mathfrak{h}$ them into a particular set of bones
that forms the skeleton of the dinosaur. They must construct a skeleton ffom the set of
bones. However, until the skeleton formed by the set of bones is completely restored, they
cannot know which set of bones a particular bone is classified into. The skeleton of an
existing animal can be applied to understand the skeleton structure of the dinosaur. When
archaeologists try to identify a bone ffom a skeleton of some dinosaur, they can utilize
as a guide another skeleton structure of an existing animal that is close to the dinosaur.
However, any restoration needs to be done by the analogy to a species evolved Rom the
dinosaur, because it should be the closest form to the dinosaur.
Similarly, historical interpretation of a theory must be an interpretation of it within a
theory developed Rom the original one. Moreover, it is necessary to verify which part of
skeleton/theory is lacking in comparison with the complete one.
The purpose of historical interpretation is to understand a past theory, to confirm what
is or is not shown by the theory, and to place the theoiy in its place in the history of
economics. Any interpretation, including a theoretical contribution of an interpreter, is not
really a historical but a theoretical one. There can be several interpretations of a past theory
in a SRP. Suppose there is a past theory $T$ , and a consistent extension of the past theory,
$T$‘, in the SRP. If there is a consistent extension of the theory $T’,$ $T”$ , in the same SRP, $T”$
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is also an interpretation of $T’$ . However, $T’$ is a better interpretation of the original theory
$T$ than $T”$ , because the former is closer to $T$ and smaller than the latter. We must continue
looking for an interpretation that is closer to the original theory. If an interpretation is
shown to be a minimum and consistent extension of the original theory, it could be the best
one. Ofcourse, ifthe original theory is a consistent axiom system, then it stands as the best
interpretation.
3 Theory of UTILITY and Scarcity as Marginal Utility The-
ory
Many economics historians have suggested that the theory of umrrY and scarcity is very
close to the marginal utility theory. For example, Schumpeter (1954: 297) states that
“Even after 1776, that theory prevailed on the Continent, and there is an unbroken line of
development between, Galiani and J. B. Say. Quesnay, Beccaria, Turgot, Verri, Condillac,
and many other authors contributed to firmly establishing the theory. They all linked price
and the pricing mechanism directly to what they conceived to be the fimdamental purpose
of economic activity, the satisfaction ofwants. “
Most economics historians who research the theory of umrrY and scarcity, agree that
the theories ofGaliani and others are close to the marginal utility theoiy, but that they lack
the concept of marginal utility. 1 Schumpeter (1954: 297) states that “What separates
Galiani from Jevons and Menger is, first, that he lacked the concept of marginal utility-
though the concept of relative scarcity comes pretty near it– and, second, that he failed to
apply his analysis to the problem of cost and of distribution. ”
lSee the references cited in Ekelund and Hebert (2002) and Kawamata (1995, 2009).
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We will examine the theories of $UT\mathbb{L}rrY$ and scarcity and show that Schumpeter’s evalu-
ation is correct, but not an exact exposition. We state that the theory of umrrY and scarcity
is certainly a marginal utility theory, but not defined as a result of the rational behavior of
an individual economic agent.
3.1 Suppositions on the Concept of UTILITY
Things that were considered common knowledge when Galiani, Turgot, and Condillac
were developing the theory of $UT\mathbb{L}\Gamma\Gamma Y$ and scarcity, are not explicitly described in their
original texts. But ffom a modem point of view, they have to be explicitly formulated to
understand the past theory. Theories of $um\Pi Y$ and scarcity before the marginal revolu-
tion supposed that the utility fimction and the marginal utility Rmction were measurable,
separable, and additive, as Katzner(1970: 5-13) suggests. 2
We cannot show that past economists made those assumptions, based on the original
texts, because they are not described in the original texts. For us to understand past theories,
however, it is necessary to complement some concepts and axioms thought to be lacking
and reconstruct a complete theory that is an extension of that past theory.
3.2 UTILITY as Marginal UtIlity
We put together propositions for the theory of $um\Pi Y$ and scarcity into an axiom system.
Given resources of commodities, the value ofa commodity is a subjective evaluation ofthat
commodity by an individual. Thus, Galiani defines the value of a commodity as follows:
Value, then, is a ratio; a compound oftwo ratios expressed as names uTnr $Y$
2We denote the concept $ofim\coprod iY$ in the theory of $m\iota m$ and scarcity by the $SMm$ CAPITAL description of
$u\tau irv$ , because $U\Pi L\Pi Y$ is supposed not to be total utility, but to be marginal utility.
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and $SCARC\Pi\gamma$ . I will explain what I mean by giving examples, so that there may
be no dispute over the words. It is evident that air and water, though elements
very usehl for human life, have no value because they lack scarcity; whereas, a
bag ofsand ffom the shores ofJapan would be a rare thing. However, assuming
that it had no special utility, it would have no value. (Galiani 1927[1751]: 283)
3
In the theory of $UT\mathbb{L}m$ and scarcity, the value of a commodity is explained in terms of
$um\Pi Y$ and scarcity. Galiani states the following:
A natural calf is nobler than a golden calf, but how much less its value
is. I answer, that if a natural calf were as rare as one of gold, its price would
be as much more than that of the golden calf as the utility and need of the
one exceeds that of the other. These people imagine that value depends on
a single factor, rather than on many which unite to form a compound ratio.
Others, I believe, say that a pound of bread is more useffil than a pound of
gold. I answer that this is a shamehl fallacy, due to not knowing that “more
usehl”and “less usehl”are relative terms, which are measured according to
the varying condition of individuals. If we are speaking of one who lacks
bread and gold, the bread is certainly more usehl; but the facts correspond to
this and are not contrary, for no one will be found who would leave the bread
and die ofhunger, taking gold instead. Those who dig in the mines never forget
to eat and sleep. But to a man who is satiated, is anything more useless than
bread? Hence it is well ifhe satisfies other passions then. (Galiani 1927[1751]:
3While the items selected by Galiani might not be appropriate ones in today’s World, the principal he
seeks to highlight remains the same.
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287-288)
In this passage, Galiani supposes the $uriLiTY$ of a commodity $h$ to be a umrrv $u_{h}(\cdot)$ that
an individual obtains by consuming a unit quantity $c_{h}$ ofthe commodity in a situation where
the individual has already consumed a quantity $x_{h}$ of the commodity. That is, for every
commodity $h$ , the $UT\mathbb{L}\Gamma\Gamma Y$ means an additional utility of an unit $c_{h}$ , when the quantity $x_{h}$ has
already been consumed. Denote total utility when the quantity $x_{h}$ is consumed as $U_{h}(x_{h})$
for every commodity $h$ , then umnv of $c_{h}$ is defined by the formula $U_{h}(x_{h}+c_{h})arrow U_{h}(x_{h})$
. As we have seen in the passage, $c_{h}$ is typically a unit of quantity, for example, a pound.
For the level of $UT\mathbb{L}rrY$ to be independent of a scale of unit quantity, the $UT\mathbb{L}\Gamma\Gamma Y$ has to be
expressed by the following ratio.
$u_{h}(x_{h})= \frac{U_{h}(x_{h}+c_{h})-U_{h}(x_{h})}{c_{h}}$.
Taking a limit, namely, $c_{h}arrow 0$ , then $u_{h}(x_{h})$ comes to equal $\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h})$ .
Then, Galiani states that the umnv $u_{h}(\cdot)$ decreases as the consumed quantity $x_{h}$ in-
creases. This means $u_{h}(x_{h})$ is a decreasing function of $x_{h}$ . In the theory of umm and
scarcity by Galiani(1927[1751]), therefore, $u_{h}(x_{h})$ camot be a total utility, because it is not
an increasing fimction of $x_{h}$ . It supports our interpretation of $u_{h}(x_{h})$ .
3.3 The Theory of UTLITY and Scarcity as an Axiom System
The group of propositions in the theory of umrrv and scarcity is almost equivalent to the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the rational behavior of an individual economic agent, such
that:
An economic agent chooses a consumption so as to maximize $his/her$ utility
(M)
under the constraint of resources.
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Provided that the results of our consideration are valid, we proceed to interpret each
proposition of Galiani. Since ”value is a ratio compounded ffom two ratios expressed as
utility and scarcity
$\partial$
we can consider the value of commodity $h,$ $v_{h}$ , to be $u_{h}(x_{h}^{*})$ where
$x_{h}^{*}\simeq\omega_{h}$ . If a commodity is scarce, then $v_{h}=u_{h}(x_{h}^{*})>0$ where $x_{h}^{*}=\omega_{h}>0$ . “Air
and water, which are elements very useffil for human life, have no value, because they lack
scarcity.’‘ This means that if a commodity is not scarce, $x_{h}^{*}<\omega_{h}$ , then $v_{h}=0$ . These
conditions can be coordinated with the following set of conditions, that is,
(Marginal Principle) $x_{h}>0$ , and $\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h}^{*})=v_{h}^{*}$ for every $h$ .
(Scarce Goods) If $\omega_{h}=x_{h}^{l}$ , then $v_{h}^{*}>0$ for every $h$ .
(Free Goods) If $\omega_{h}>x_{h}^{*}$ , then $v_{h}^{*}=0$ for every $h$ .
Comparing these conditions with the following ones,
$(KT1)$ $\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h}^{*})\leqq v_{h}^{*}$ $( \frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h}^{*})-v_{h}^{*})x_{h}^{*}=0$ $x_{h}^{*}\geqq 0$
$(KT2)$ $\omega_{h}\geqq x_{h}^{*}$ $v_{h}^{*}(\omega_{h}-x_{h}^{*})=0$ $v_{h}^{*}\geqq 0$
we can see that the Comer solution case where if $\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h}^{*})<v_{h}^{*}$ , then $x_{h}^{*}=0$ for every
$h$ , is not referred to. This is understandable, because this condition makes sense in the
theoiy of price, but does not make sense in the theory of value. The price system is given
independent ffom the marginal condition, while the value system is defined by and equal
to the marginal utility.
Ifwe define the ffinction $U(x)$ , where $x=(x_{1},x_{2}, \cdots , x_{H})$ , by
$U(x)= \sum_{h-1}^{H}U_{h}(x_{h})=\sum_{h=1}^{H}f_{0}\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(c_{h})dc_{h}=\sum_{h=1}^{{}_{h}H}f_{0}^{h}u_{h}(c_{h})dc_{h}$
then the umrrY, $u_{h}(x_{h}^{*})$ , is defined as a derivative of the total utility function, $\frac{\partial U_{h}}{\partial x_{h}}(x_{h}^{*})$ .
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4 By Kuhn-Tucker’s Equivalence Theorem (Intriligator 1981), Kuhn-Tucker conditions (
$KT1)$ and $(KT2)$ are equivalent to the problem of a consumer’s choice such that
$\max\sum_{1}^{H}U_{h}$ subject to $\sum_{1}^{H}(\omega_{h}-x_{h})$ or $\max\sum_{1}^{H}U_{h}+\sum_{1}^{H}v_{h}(\omega_{h}-x_{h})$ .
where $v_{h}$ is a Lagrangian multiplier to be a value of commodity $h$ . 5 Therefore, under
a certain set of implicit conditions, the theory of $um\Pi v$ and scarcity implies a group of
conditions very close to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are equivalent to the prob-
lem of a consumer’s utility maximization under resource constraints. This means the the-
ory of $uri_{L}nv$ and scarcity has almost the same structure as the marginal utility theory of
Menger(1950[1871]).
From an axiomatic point of view, the theory of $uriL\Gamma\Gamma Y$ and scarcity is characterized by
an axiom system consisting of Kuhn-Tucker conditions $(KT1)$ and $(KT2)$. While the
marginal conditions are derived Rom the axiom of consumer’s utility maximization, as are
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, in the marginal utility theory, a group of conditions very close to
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are assumed in the theory ofumrrY and scarcity. This implies
that in the theory of $UTiLm$ and scarcity, the concept ofmarginal utility is a basic concept
that is not defined in terms of other concepts. Furthermore, in the marginal utility theory,
the concept ofmarginal utility is a derived concept defined in terms of other concepts. For
this reason, historians have considered the concept of marginal utility to be missing the
theory of umrrY and scarcity.
4Given the concept of the marginal utility function, Jevons(1965: 49-52) and Wakas$(1954[1874- 77]:76)$
derive the total utility function from the marginal utility function.
$s_{The}$ proposition such that a UTILIIY is a decreasing fimction, with suppositions ofcardinality, separability,
and additivity, implies the concavity of a total utility fmction, which is a sufficient condition for a solution
of the Kuhn-Tucker problem to exist.
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3.4 The Significance of the Marginal Revolution
The results ofthe previous subsection show that the marginal principle was not an original
achievement in the marginal revolution. The theory of $UT\mathbb{L}rrY$ and scarcity just advances a
group ofpropositions characterizing the value of a commodity utilizing the marginal prin-
ciple. Those propositions are not organized on the basis of any set of more fimdamental
propositions. One of significances of the marginal revolution is that the group of propo-
sitions in the theory of $UT\mathbb{L}\Pi Y$ and scarcity is characterized by the rational behavior of an
economic agent. This was noted by Menger(1950).
4 Marginal Productivity Theory and the Old Quarrel
The controversy on the Exhaustion Theorem in the marginal productivity theory is smdied
by Stigler(1941) and Jaff\’e(1964), who called the controversy the $otd$ quarrel; however, the
theoretical development of the marginal productivity theory is not completely explained.
Two difficulties should be pointed out. First, the Exhaustion Theorem can be established
within the distinct specifications of an economic environment. This is the reason why
the marginal productivity theory is controversial. Therefore, we must be consistent in our
coordination ofthe theories. Second, the marginal productivity theory supposes a specified
economic environment, and therefore the theory would vanish in the development of a
general equilibrium theory. Without knowledge of the present microeconomic theory, it
is impossible to understand the arguments, of the economists involved in the controversy,
with any coherence.
We confirmwhat the economists involved in the controversy, namely, Wicksteed (1992 [1894]),
Walras $(1954[1874- 77])$, Pareto (1964[1897], 1966[1909]), Barone (1965 [1895]), andWick-
sell (1958[1902]), say about the Exhaustion Theorem. Then, we interpret their theories in
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the general equilibrium theory and coordinate them.
4.1 The Old Quarrel over the Exhaustion Theorem
Wicksteed(1992[1894]) interpreted the classical theory of distribution as a producer theory
and proved the Exhaustion Theorem within the ffamework of producer theory. Suppose a
product denoted by $y$ and $n$ productive factors denoted by $z=$ $(z_{1}, \cdots , z_{n})$ , where the price
of the product is denoted by $p$ and the prices of the productive factors by $q=(q_{1}, \cdots , q_{n})$
A producer is characterized by a production fimction denoted by $y=f(z_{1}, \cdots,z_{n})$ . The
producer chooses his production $(y^{*},z_{1}^{*},$ $\cdots,z_{n}^{*})$ so as to maximize his profit $py-q\cdot z$ under
the constraint of production fimction. If there exists an equilibrium production $(y^{*},z^{*})$ for
a given price system $(p^{*},q)$ , the following propositions are established.
(MPTI) $q_{1}^{r}=p^{*}f_{1},$ $\cdots,q_{n}^{*}=pf_{n}$ .
(MPT2) $y^{*}=f_{1}z_{1}^{*}+\cdots+f_{n}z_{n}^{*}$ for any $(\gamma,z^{r})$ .
where $f_{h}= \frac{\partial f}{\partial z_{h}}$ for every $h$ . The producer equilibrium exists if $f$ is homogeneous of
deyee one and satisfies the law of decreasing marginal productivity. Wicksteed states
“under ordinary conditions of competitive industry, it is sensibly or approximately true that
ifevery factor ofproduction draws a remuneration detemiined by its marginal efficiency or
significance, the whole product will be exactly distributed. ”(Wicksteed 1992[1894]: 89)
Note that a producer theory assumes a price system is determined in a competitive
equilibrium of a market economy; therefore, the Exhaustion Theorem is established for a
given price system. If a production fimction is homogeneous of degree one, the output of
product maximizing profit may be $0$ or infinite for an arbitrarily determined price system.
If so, the first theorem is not established, because an equilibrium production is a comer
solution.
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Walras constructed a general equilibrium theory with the support of his colleagues
(Jaff\’e 1964, 1965). He consulted with Piccard about the problem of consumer’s utility
maximization with, and with Amstein about producer’s cost minimization. Piccard an-
swered Walras by explaining a solution in temis of elementary graphical presentation (Jaff\’e
1965: L. 211). Walras understood Piccard’s explanation and utilized it in the first version
of his \’El\’ements. Amstein answered Walras by explaining a solution using a Lagrangian
multiplier method (Jaff\’e 1965: L. 364). Amstein’s explanation was, however, too technical
for Walras to understand and therefore Walras did not utilize it in the first version of his
El\’ements; instead assuming a production technology of constant input-output coefficients.
Then, in accord with a suggestion ffom Pareto (1955), he began to tackle the Amstein’s
explanation to construct a producer theory.
Hence, Walras read Wicksteed’s Essay. Walras immediately noticed that the Exhaus-
tion Theorem could be derived from the conditions ofproducer equilibrium and ffee com-
petition equilibrium. Walras supposed that the first proposition ofthe Exhaustion Theorem
(MPTI) was derived ffom producer cost minimization under the constraint of the produc-
tion technology. Then, the second proposition (MPT2) was derived ffom (MPTI) and the
condition of ffee competition equilibrium such that $p^{*}y^{*}=q_{1}zi+\cdots+q_{n}z_{n}^{*}$ . As Pareto
(1955) suggested, Walras’s demonstration of (MPTI) was not valid. (MPTI) is derived
ffom producer’s profit maximization. Walras supposed that his Exhaustion Theorem was
more general than Wicksteed’s, but he could not prove it because he was not familiar
enough with mathematics to solve optimization problems.
Walras first consulted Pareto about his idea, but Pareto was not very interested in it.
Pareto (1966[1909]) had denied the possibility of production fimction homogeneous of
degree one that the Exhaustion Theorem assumes. He understood Euler’s Theorem and the
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fact that the Exhaustion Theorem is established if the production function is homogeneous
of degree one (Pareto 1964[1897]: 717, $n.2$). Pareto (1966[1909]: 631-39) supposes a
general economic environment, where producers have variable productive factors and fixed
ones, and thus the production hnction cannot be homogeneous of degree one.
Walras then consulted Barone. Barone (1965[1895) revised Walras’s theory by taking
account ofPareto’s advice about a production theory (Pareto 1955), and proved the Exhaus-
tion Theorem in the theory of a competitive market. He submitted a review ofWicksteed’s
Essay to Economic Joumal, where Barone tried to show that Walras’s Theorem is more
general than Wicksteed’s Exhaustion Theorem. Edgeworth, the editor ofEconomic Jour-
nal, rejected it. Walras was angry at this, and criticized the English theory of distribution
in Walras(1954[1895]), which is rewritten as $36^{th}$ lesson ofWalras$(1954[1874- 77])$ . Hav-
ing explained Barone’s reasoning, Walras states that “M. Barone deduced this proposition
with logical rigour ffom my theory of economic equilibrium. Mr. Wicksteed, however, fell
short of establishing it for the more general case and would have been better inspired if he
had not made such efforts to appear ignorant of the works of his predecessors. (Walras
$1954[1895]:495)$ 6
In Walras’s reasoning, the most important fact is that his claim is apparently valid, but it
does not make sense if a free competition equilibrium does not exist. This is the problem of
the existence of the competitive equilibrium of a market economy. Walras did not suggest
any condition for the existence of producer’s equilibrium and market equilibrium. Wal-
ras thought he had proven the existence of competitive equilibrium of a market economy
by confirming that the number of unknowns is equal to that of demand-supply equilib-
rium equations. Among his contemporaries, his reasoning was common knowledge and
the problem of the existence of equilibrium was an open question. However, the existence
6See Jaff\’e(1964) about the old quarrel in detail.
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of market equilibrium is proven ffom the property of economic environment characteriz-
ing consumer’s preference and producer’s technology. It is necessary to assume not only
decreasing marginal productivity for every productive factor, but also, for example, the
homogeneity of degree one of the production $fi\iota nction$ .
Later, Wickse11(1958[1902]) showed that the Exhaustion Theorem is valid if the pro-
duction fimction has a U-shaped long-run average cost curve as well as it being homoge-
neous of the first degree. This supports Walras’s and Barone’s claim that they proved the
Exhaustion Theorem within the more general ffamework of general equilibrium.
4.2 The Exhaustion Theorem in the General Equilibrium Theory
We coordinate the assertions on the Exhaustion Theorem of Wicksteed, Walras, Barone,
Pareto, and Wicksell, and show that we can interpret them as specified theories of a gen-
eral marginal productivity theory. It is necessary to interpret the marginal productivity
theories in the controversy within the Ramework ofthe general equilibrium theory. We can
define the marginal productivity theory as one of a competitive market where the follow-
ing propositions are established: (1) the prices of productive factors are determined, (2)
the prices of productive factors are proved to be equal to the marginal productivity of the
respective productive factors, and (3) if (2) is valid, then the value of the total product is
completely exhausted by the share ofthe productive factors. Proposition (1) is derived ffom
the theory ofprice determination. The theory ofa competitive market is one ofaltematives.
The existence of equilibrium is essential. Proposition (2) is derived from producer profit
maximization umder the constraint of production technology. In general, the solution is
characterized by the Kuhn$=Tucker$ Equivalence Theorem (Intriligator 1984). Proposition
(3) is Euler’s Theorem (Apostol 1967), which is a tautology because it is a mathematical
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theorem. Euler’s Theorem implies that the Exhaustion Theorem is equivalent to the linear
homogeneity of the total production function. 7
The economic theories in the controversy assume certain specified economic environ-
ments. First, all the commodities are distinctly classified into products and productive
factors in the marginal productivity theory. However, whether a commodity is a product or
a productive factor is not apriori determined, but is determined depending on the property
of the economic environment, such as a consumer’s preference and a producer’s technol-
ogy. Second, there is no joint product in the marginal productivity theory. This implies
that a production fimction is expressed by $y=f(z_{1}, \cdots,z_{n})$ . Third, since the marginal
productivity theory is a theory of a competitive market, it is necessary to prove the exis-
tence of a competitive equilibrium of a market economy. The production technology is
expressed by a differentiable production fimction satisfying the law ofdecreasing marginal
productivity. However, to prove the existence of an equilibrium, it is sufficient to assume
continuity, convexity, and several adequate conditions of an consumption set, preference
ordering, and a production set; but not necessary to assume differentiability of utility and
production functions (Debreu 1959). This is because the marginal principle of distribution
is significant in the economic environment characterized by differentiable functions, but
not in the economic environment characterized by convex analysis. Fourth, a production
technology exhibiting constant retums to scale is specific. It may exhibit decreasing or
increasing retums to scale depending on its properties.
These then are the reasons why the modem theory of a producer does not refer to the
Exhaustion Theorem. The theorem assumes a much too specific economic environment for
modem economic theories.
7EULER’S THEOREM: Let $f(x)=0$ be continuous, and also differentiable. Then $f$ is homogeneous of
degree $k$ if and only if $kf(x)=$ fi $\partial\partial f(x)x_{i}$ .
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4.3 Reconstruction ofWalras’s Exhaustion Theorem
We show that in the competitive equilibrium of a market economy, Walras’s condition
that every producer makes neither profit nor loss is equivalent to the condition that the
total production hnction is homogeneous of degree zero. Let $y_{j}=$ $(y_{j1},$ $\cdots$ , $y_{jn})$ be a
production ofproducer $j$ , and $f_{j}(y_{j})\leqq 0$ be a production function ofproducer $j$ , which is
homogeneous of degree zero, for every $j\in\{1, \cdots , n\}$ . Then, the total production fUnction
is defined as $f(y)\leqq 0$ such that $f(\gamma)=f_{1}(\gamma_{1})+\cdots+f_{n}(\gamma_{n})$ . The total production fimction
is homogeneous of degree zero. The equilibrium condition ofproducer $j$ is described by:
$y_{j}^{*}$ maximizes $p^{*}\cdot y_{j}$ subject to $f_{j}(y_{j})\leqq 0$ , for everyj.
Then, the price of productive factor $q_{h}$ relative to the price of product $p$ is equal to the
marginal productivity of the productive factor $f_{h}’$ , for very productive factor $h$ . Therefore,
the value of the product is equal to the value of all the productive factors.
In a competitive simation, the following theorem is valid (Debreu 1959: 3.4 (1)).
DBCENTRALIZATION THEOREM: Given a price system $p^{*},$
$y^{*}$ maximizes $p^{*}\cdot y$ subject to $f(\nu)\leqq 0$ , if and only if
$(y_{j}^{*})$ maximizes $p^{*}\cdot y_{j}$ subject to $f_{j}(y_{j})\leqq 0$ , for everyj,
The Decentralization Theorem states that every individual producer maximizes his profit
subject to his production fimction if and only if the total production maximizes the total
profit subject to the total production function. By producer profit maximization, the price
of a productive factor is equal to the price by the marginal productivity of the productive
factor for every productive factor for every individual equilibrium production. Under the
Decentralization Theorem, this is also valid for the total equilibrium production.
In the general equilibrium theory, the Exhaustion Theorem is established for the total
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equilibr\’ium production. Therefore, applying Euler’s Theorem, the total production hnc-
tion is homogeneous of degree zero. Inversely, if the total production hnction is homo-
geneous of degree zero, the Exhaustion Theorem is established, and it is not necessary
for an individual production fimction to be homogeneous of degree zero (Debreu 1959:
88, $n.1)$ . This is the implication of Walrasian Exhaustion Theorem. If the marginal pro-
ductivity theory were completed, then it would be the theory of McKenzie (1959) where
differentiability is satisfied.
4.4 Pareto’s consideration
Pareto extended and generalized Walrasian general equilibrium theory. He generalized
the concept of utility ffom the separable and additional utility fimction to the ordinal one.
He also generalized the concept of production technology ffom the production function
in which all the productive factors are fixed or variable, to that in which some productive
factors are variable and others fixed (Pareto 1966[1909]: 636). Therefore Pareto’s pro-
duction fimcbon $y=f(z_{1}, \cdots ,z_{n})$ cannot be homogeneous of degree one, because it has
both variable productive factors and fixed ones. Thus, Pareto had a negative view about the
Exhaustion Theorem. However, as long as he adopts Walras’s concept of $\theta ee$ competition
equilibrium, Pareto $s$ theory implies the existence ofa competitive equilibrium in a market
economy in which the Exhaustion Theorem is established.
Consider the problem ofcost minimization subject to a production fimction with a fixed
productive factor $\overline{y}=f^{s}$ $(z_{1}, \cdots , z_{h}^{-}, \cdots,z_{n})$ , and the problem of cost minimization subject
to a production mnction without a fixed productive factor $\overline{y}=f(z_{1}, \cdots,z_{n})$ . Then, we
have the cost hmction with a fixed factor $h,$ $c^{s}$ $(q_{1}, \cdots , q_{n},\overline{y,}z_{h}^{-})$ , and that without a fixed
factor, $c(q_{1}, \cdots,q_{n},\overline{y})$ . We can consider $f$ as the production function of the industry, and
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$f^{s}$ as that of the individual producer. We can also consider $c$ as the cost function of the
industry, and $c^{S}$ as that of the individual producer. The Envelop Theorem characterizes the
relationship between these cost hnctions. 8 In Walras’s ffee competition equilibrium, the
Exhaustion Theorem is established and the production function of the industry $f$ is homo-
geneous of degree one. Then, the average cost curve of the industry $AC$ is horizontal, and
the average cost curve of an individual producer $AC^{s}$ is tangential to that, as is shown in
the figure 1. If a producer has a fixed productive factor, the producer can choose the input
of all the variable productive factors to minimize cost. Thus, even if an individual produc-
tion fimction $f^{s}$ has a fixed factor and is not homogeneous of degree one, the Exhaustion
theorem can be established if the production function $f$ is homogeneous of degree one:
Pareto did not realize that a Ree competition equilibrium implies the production function
of the industry is homogeneous of degree one.
Figurel Cost structure in a ffee competition equilibrium
In modem microeconomics, the Envelop Theorem is considered to characterize the re-
lationship between short-run and long-run cost fUnctions. The production hnction without
fixed productive factor should be interpreted as the long-run one. Therefore, the Exhaustion
Theorem should be considered to be a long-mn equilibrium of Ree competition (Osana,
1987).
$\overline{8E_{NVBLOP}}$THEOREM:For $y=\tilde{y}>0,$ $c^{s}(q_{1}, \cdots , q_{n},\overline{y}.\overline{z_{h}})=c(q_{1}, \cdots , q_{n},\overline{y})$ , then
$\mu^{S}=\frac{\partial c^{s}(q_{1},\cdots q_{n},\overline{y,}\overline{z_{h}})}{\partial y’}=\frac{\partial c(q_{1},\cdots,q_{n},=y]}{\partial y}=\mu$ .
where $\mu^{S}$ is the Lagrmgian multiplier ofthe cost minimization problem with a fixed productive factor $h$ , and
$\mu$ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the cost minimization problem without a fixed productive factor.
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4.5 The Old Quarrel in Retrospect
As long as the marginal productivity theory is a distribution theory, it must be one that
determines the prices and inputs of all the productive factors. Therefore, we can say that
Wicksteed’s Exhaustion Theorem is not sufficient without a theory ofa competitive market.
Within the Ramework ofgeneral equilibrium theory, a price system is determined at market
equilibrium, and the Exhaustion Theorem is equivalent to the homogeneity of degree zero
of the total production function. It is not necessary to $assum_{\text{ }}e$ the homogeneity of degree
zero of an individual production ffinction.
However, microeconomic theories should be described in terms of an economy consist-
ing of many consumers, many producers, and many commodities, where each consumer $i$
must be characterized by $i$ ’s preference and each producer $j$ must be characterized by $j$ ’s
production technology. Therefore Wicksell (1958[1902]) assumed an individual produc-
tion fimction first exhibiting increasing and then decreasing retums to scale.
Jaff\’e (1964) states that the old quarrel was not over the distribution theory but over
the producer theory. Stigler (1941) focuses his attention on the controversy over the Ex-
haustion Theorem. But we have showed that the old quarrel was also over the theory of a
competitive market. This point of view supports an understanding of Walras’s assertion;
that his Exhaustion Theorem is more general than Wicksteed’s.
5 Historical Interpretation of an Ambiguous Theory
There can be plural interpretations of the same text because of the definition of interpreta-
tion. Waterman (2003) takes examples ofMorishima’s and Samuelson’s interpretations of
Ricardo (Morishima, 1989; Samuelson, 1978) and Marx (Morishima, 1973, ch.4; Samuel-
son, 1971). We take an example ofNegishi’s (1989) and Kawamata’s (1995, 2009) inter-
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pretation ofWieser’s theory of $nat\iota ual$ value (Wieser, 1893 [1889]). Wieser defines natural
value as:
The relation of natural value to exchange value is clear. Natural value is
one element in the formation of exchange value. It does not, however, enter
simply and thoroughly into exchange value. On the one side, it is disturbed by
human imperfection, by error, Raud, force, and chance; and on the other side,
by the present order of society, by the existence ofprivate property, and by dif-
ferences between rich and poor, as a consequence ofwhich a second element,
namely, purchasing power, mingles itself in the formation of exchange value.
For natural value, goods are estimated simply according to their marginal util-
ity; for exchange value, it is according to a combination oftheirmarginal utility
and purchasing power. (Wieser 1893[1889]: 61-2)
This statement implies that Wieser sees the natural value of a commodity as an exchange
value when the incomes (purchasing power) of all individual agents are equal to one an-
other. Two interpretations are possible. One is based on interpreting the income as a real
income; the other has it as a nominal income. The former interpretation is that ofNegishi
(1989). He characterizes the natural value as a shadow price where the utilitarian social
welfare function is maximized. The natural value is the marginal utilitarian social welfare
of a commodity when the utilitarian social welfare is maximized. The latter interpretation
is that of Kawamata (1995, 2009). He defines the namral value based on the distribution
economy ofMalinvaud $(1977: 107arrow 110)$, where the resources of commodities are not pri-
vately owned and, given a price system and a nominal income, a consumer chooses $his/her$
consumption so as to maximize $his/her$ utility subject to the income constraint. Therefore,
the natural value of a commodity is the competitive price of the commodity when the nom-
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inal income is the same for every consumer. In this case, the allocation at the natural value
is a fair allocation.
Note that the idea of real income was used by Hicks (1946[1939]) in the context of the
Slutsky equation in the $1930s$ . It is not reasonable to suppose that before Hicks, Wieser
considered a real income as the utility level without any necessity of defining it in his
theory. Weser defines the natural value not in terms of social welfare fimction, but in
terms of exchange value.
When a past theory contains incompatible sets ofpropositions, that is to say, the theory
is inconsistent, it is impossible to interpret the theory as a whole. To interpret an inconsis-
tent theory, we have only to focus our attention on a consistent set of propositions. Then,
we interpret the consistent parts of the original theory. There can be several interpreta-
tions depending on which part of the original theory is interpreted. In such cases, we must
review whether or not an individual interpretation is accurate enough to be a historical in-
terpretation. If we interpret the theory as a historical fact, we can review each altemative
inteipretation and minimize parts of the interpretation alien to the original text.
6 Concluding Remarks
There is a historical interpretation of a past theory if and only if there is a stream of theo-
ries developed Rom that past theory, or a Scientific Research Program to which the theory
belongs. A theory must be interpreted as a consistent axiom system; therefore, an interpre-
tation of a theory will be a consistent axiomatic extension of the theory. We showed three
examples of historical interpretations in the history of the general equilibrium theoiy. The
first example of interpretation of the theory of utility and scarcity shows that axiomatic
interpretation is effective in interpreting an insufficient theory of the past Rom which a
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SRP developed. The second shows that a past theory $T$ may include invalid propositions
in a present one that is thought to have been developed from the theory $T$ . The history of
economic theory is formed by theories dominating their contemporary ones, which have
arisen Rom a SRP. The set of abandoned theories includes those which are invalid or are
incompatible with the present established theories. The third example shows that there
may be plural historical interpretations of a consistent theory that is decisive relative to the
core set oftheorems. This is because a past theory that has been regarded as consistent and
complete may be ambiguous Rom the viewpoint of a present theory, even ifthe past theory
was regarded as complete by its contemporaries.
Our concept of historical interpretation is the same as that of Rational Reconstruction
(RR) and Mathematical Modeling (MM) ofWatemian (2003). RR is a set of interpretations
of economic thought or of economic theory in the SRP to which they belong, where these
are not always expressed in terms of mathematics. RR but not MM is a set of economic
thoughts and literary economic theories among which a certain concept of development is
defined. MM is a set of mathematical interpretations of economic thoughts or economic
theories, where these do not always belong to a stream of theories or SRP developed ffom
them. There are sometimes significant open questions in past theories. Resolving such
open questions ffom the history of economics makes a theoretical contribution to present
day economics. Morishima’s and Samuelson’s interpretations of the theories of Ricardo
and Marx are such theoretical interpretations that contribute to modem economics. They
are examples ofMM but not RR. Ifa researcher resolves open questions posited in a certain
text ffom the history of economics, it is the same as resolving open questions posited at the
foreRont ofpresent day economic research.
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Figure 1: Cost structure in a Ree competition equilibrium
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